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I. Introduction
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) were written to
eliminate, or at least to lessen, arbitrariness and caprice and to establish
t This article is adapted from a paper presented at the biennial conference of the
American Psychology-Law Society on March 11, 1994, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B. 1966, Rutgers University; J.D. 1969,
Columbia University School of Law.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law. B.S. 1978, Union
College; J.D. 1982, The Washington College of Law at the American University.
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objective, normative standards against which convicted defendants' behavior
could be assessed. The Guidelines-promulgated in response to criticisms
of indeterminate sentences and seemingly inexplicable disparities in
sentences for like crimes-were meant to guide judges and to educate the
public about factors that could either increase or decrease sentences. 2
One such factor is mental disability. A federal judge can depart from
the prescribed ranges when "the defendant committed a nonviolent offense
while suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting
from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants."3 In such cases, a lower
sentence "may be warranted" to reflect the extent to which the reduced
mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense as long as the
defendant's criminal history "does not indicate a need for incarceration to
protect the public."4  It should be noted, however, that a Sentencing
Commission policy statement declares that mental and emotional conditions
1. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-742 (1988) (stating general rules for sentencing, probation, and
appeals); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988) (establishing the United States Sentencing Commission).
The constitutionality of these Guidelines was upheld in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 412 (1989). See generally Keri A. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged,
Dismissed or Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Promote Respect for
the Law? 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 835 (1993) (describing the sentencing process under
the Guidelines).
2. See generally Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 883 (1990) (stating that empirical
studies revealed disparities in sentences for similar offenses); Julia L. Black, Note, The
Constitutionality of Federal Sentences Imposed Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 After
Mistretta v. United States, 75 IowA L. REV. 767, 771, 773-74 (1990) (describing the goals of
increased public understanding and more defined sentencing); Kirk Houser, Downward
Departures: The Lower Envelope of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 361
(1993) (discussing the specific issue of downward departures).
3. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5(2.13 (1994)
[hereinafter MANUAL).
4. Id. Deviation from the putative sentence due to factors bearing on mental capacity
appear three times in the Guidelines. An example is 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988), which
provides:
(d) The Commission in establishing categories of defendants for use in the
guidelines and policy statements governing the imposition of sentences of
probation, a fine, or imprisonment, governing the imposition of other authorized
sanctions, governing the size of a fine or the length of a term of probation,
imprisonment, or supervised release, and governing the conditions of probation,
supervised release, or imprisonment, shall consider whether the following matters,
among others, with respect to a defendant, have any relevance to the nature,
extent, place of service, or other incidents of an appropriate sentence, and shall
take them into account only to the extent that they do have relevance...
(4) mental and emotional condition to the extent that such condition
mitigates the defendant's culpability or to the extent that such condition is other-
wise plainly relevant ....
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are not "ordinarily relevant" in determining whether a sentence should be
outside the Guidelines' ranges.'
Great discretion is vested in the trial courts in determining when a
sentence reduction is appropriate under the Guidelines, and decisions not to
depart from the Guidelines are generally not appealable.' Only when it
appears that the district court misunderstood its authority to reduce the
defendant's sentence will appellate courts be willing to disturb sentencing
determinations.7
The cases reported so far reflect no coherent reading of the Guidelines
and no real understanding of the role of mental disability, short of an
exculpating insanity defense, in criminal behavior Federal judges are
remarkably inconsistent in their reading of mental disability.9 The caselaw
5. See MANUAL, supra note 3, § 5H1.3 ("Mental and emotional conditions are not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the guidelines, except
as provided in [the general provisions of Chapter 5]."). In Williams v. United States, the Court
held that policy statements are an authoritative guide in determining the meaning of the
applicable guideline. 112 S. Ct. 1112, 1115 (1992). However, the legislative history of the
Commission's policy statement on the influence of mental disability is spotty at best. The
brevity of the policy statement seems to be due to Congress's failure to provide any coherent
explanation of the weight due individual offender characteristics and a failure of the Com-
mission to conduct or refer to any empirical studies or evidence regarding the effect of mental
disability on sentencing patterns. Although this omission was initially recognized by the
Commission, it was later deleted without any additional explanation. Marc Miller & Daniel
J. Freed, Offender Characteristics & Victim Vulnerability: The Differences Between Policy
Statements and Guidelines, 3 FED. SENT. R. 3, 4 (1990).
6. Compare United States v. Follett, 905 F.2d 195, 197 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
refusal to grant a downward departure on the basis of psychological problems and diminished
mental capacity was not appealable), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2796 (1991) and United States
v. Ghannam, 899 F.2d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that a refusal to grant downward
departure for diminished capacity was not appealable) with Follett, 905 F.2d at 199 (Heaney,
S.C.J., dissenting) (advocating remand to the district court for a reconsideration of defendant's
mental disorders and a resentence) and United States v. Patterson, 15 F.3d 169, 171 (1 lth Cir.
1994) (stating that when the district court refused to grant a downward departure on the
grounds that it lacked authority, the refusal was appealable) and United States v. Schechter,
13 F.3d 1117, 1120 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a court of appeals will review a ruling only
when decision not to depart results from the district court's mistaken conclusion that it lacked
authority).
7. See United States v. Ruklick, 919 F.2d 95, 98 (8th Cir. 1990) (reversing trial court's
refusal to depart from Guidelines when defendant had the mental capacity of a 12-year-old).
On the need for specific findings in Guideline decisionmaking, see United States v. Zackson,
6 F.3d 911, 912 (2d Cir. 1993) (remanding case for an adequate statement of the reason for
the 151 month sentence); United States v. Perkins, 963 F.2d 1523, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(stating that a court is required to make specific findings of whether cocaine found in
codefendant's house was reasonably foreseeable in order to satisfy the sentencing guidelines).
8. See generally 3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIvIL AND CRIMINAL
§ 16.18A (1989 & Supp. 1994) (discussing how the courts have invoked the Guidelines in
violent and nonviolent crimes).
9. See generally Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal
AM. J. CGRim. L.
suggests that federal judges have not seriously considered the way mental
disability should be assessed in sentencing decisions, and that random
decisions generally reflect a judge's "ordinary common sensical read" of
whether an individual defendant "really" could have overcome his
disability.'0
We contend that this is caused by several factors:
(1) a lack of understanding on the part of federal judges and defense
counsel as to the meaning of mental disability and its potential
interrelationship with criminal behavior;"
(2) an attitude by federal prosecutors that such mitigating evidence is a
mere play for sympathy and an inappropriate factor for consideration
at the sentencing phase, an attitude given strong support by Justice
Scalia's dissent in Penry v. Lynaugh, when he argued that the
presentation of testimony to a death penalty jury about a defendant's
mental retardation and childhood sexual and physical abuse led to an
inappropriate "outpouring ... [of] unfocused sympathy;' 12
(3) the structure of the insanity defense as an all-or-nothing alternative,
causing many to believe that lesser evidence of mental disorder is
simply an insufficient factor to consider in sentencing decisions; 3
Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "Doctrinal
Abyss"? 29 ARIz. L. REv. 1, 4 (1987) (noting that there is no common thread or cohesiveness
among decisions using mental disability defenses).
10. On the way that similar behavior drives insanity defense jurisprudence, see MICHAEL
L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANrrY DEFENSE 423-29 (1994) (arguing that the
therapeutic potential of different policies must be considered in order to make the insanity
defense system more coherent) [hereinafter PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE]; see also Michael L.
Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REv. 373 (1992) [hereinafter Perlin, Sanism].
11. See generally Keri A. Gould, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Competency
Evaluation Requests: The Defense Attorney's Dilemma 18 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 83
(1995) (describing the theraputic jurisprudence approach and applying it to the arraignment
process); Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency,
47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 627-30 (1993) (arguing that the relationship between legal process
and litigants is pretextual).
12. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 359-60 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part); see 3 PERLIN, supra note 8, § 17.09 (Supp. 1994) (discussing Justice
Scalia's concurrence); Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases:
The Puzzling Role of "Mitigating" Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 239, 244 (1994) (discussing Justice Scalia's concurrence).
13. United States v. Ruldick, 919 F.2d 95, 97-98 (8th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the
sentencing court is not required to find that reduced mental capacity is the sole cause of the
offense before downward departure from the Guidelines is justified); cf. United States v.
Gentry, 925 F.2d 186, 188-89 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that the sentencing court cannot merely
point to a mental condition, but must assess whether the defendant possesses "significantly
reduced mental incapacity" in justifying downward departure from Guidelines) (emphasis in
original).
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(4) and ambivalence about mental disability as exculpatory evidence,
which frequently results in putatively-mitigating testimony serving an
aggravating function, most notably in death penalty cases.1 4
This set of misassumptions leads to what we call the Rashomon effect,
the way that multiple perspectives will lead to multiple interpretations of the
same "facts,"' 15 an effect that inevitably distorts the intent of any set of
guidelines. At the roots of these misassumptions is another set of
unconscious factors that compel judicial behavior. Most important among
these factors are: (1) punitive urges that drive the criminal justice system
in spite of statutory or caselaw to the contrary;16 (2) "sanist" behavior in
the criminal justice system; 17 and (3) "pretextual" behavior of courts and
other factfinders in that system. 8
Although there is a robust developing literature about almost all other
aspects of the Guidelines, 9 virtually nothing has been written on the
14. This happens notwithstanding the Supreme Court mandate that sentencing authorities
consider any relevant mitigating evidence a defendant offers as basis for a sentence less than
death. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that the sentencer not be precluded from considering any mitigating
factors of the defendant's character or record as a basis for a sentence less than death);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982) (reasoning that mitigating evidence cannot,
as a matter of law, be kept from the sentencer); 3 PERLIN, supra note 8, § 17.09 (discussing
Eddings). Consequently, mental disability is viewed as a mitigating factor at the penalty phase
of death penalty cases only when the crime is seen as not "planful" and the defendant
previously "sought help" for his condition. See Perlin, supra note 12, at 245-49 (commenting
that empirical evidence shows that factfinders are more receptive to a mental status defense
not involving "planful" behavior and discussing, inter alia, Lawrence White, The Mental Illness
Defense in the Capital Penalty Hearing, 5 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 411, 414-19 (1987)).
15. See David S. Sokolow, From Kurosawa to (Duncan) Kennedy: The Lessons of
Rashomon for Current Legal Education, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 969, 975 (suggesting that
perception, point of view, and capacity to remember all influence interpretation of facts).
16. PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 10, at 49-59.
17. PERLIN, INsANrrY DEFENSE, supra note 10, at 392; Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A.
Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science Evidence, and the Development of Mental Disability Law
Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 47, 51-52 (1993); see infra Part IV.B.
18. Perlin, supra note 11, at 627; see infra Part IV.C.
19. An August 14, 1994 simple search ("federal sentencing guidelines") of the
WESTLAW/JLR database revealed 190 documents. For recent representative articles, see Kate
Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 223 (1993) (detailing the legislative
history of the Guidelines); Eric Berlin, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Failure to
Elininate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 1993 WiS. L.
REv. 187 (criticizing the Guidelines as violating congressional goals and public policy because
sentences handed down under the Guidelines often do not adequately relate to the defendant's
actual culpability); Emmett H. Miller, III, Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational
Defendants, 46 VAND. L. REV. 197 (1993) (describing the Guidelines and proposing a number
of amendments to improve them); Houser, supra note 2 (proposing broader discretion for
judges to consider factors not included in the Guidelines).
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application of the Guidelines to mentally disabled persons.20 This Article
seeks to explore that subject by illuminating the ways in which prejudice,
misunderstanding, and distrust have infected the federal sentencing process.
We begin in Part II with a brief history of the Guidelines, and then, in
Part IT, we show how the mental disability language in the Guidelines was
chosen. Part IV then defines "sanism" and "pretextuality," and Part V
shows how those concepts have affected the jurisprudence of the courts on
this issue. Then in Part VI, we more closely demonstrate how the courts'
decisions in this area reflect unconscious feelings about mentally disabled
defendants, feelings that stem from our urge to punish and that are reflected
in the sanist and pretextual court system. We conclude by looking first at
these questions through a therapeutic jurisprudence lens 2' and then by
offering some modest policy recommendations for the future.
II. The Sentencing Guidelines
22
In response to criticisms of indeterminate sentencing,23 Congress
passed the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act 4 in an attempt to bring about a
20. But see Robert Weinstock et al., Psychiatry and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
15 AM. J. FoRENsIc PSYCHIATRY 67 (1994) (arguing that psychiatry can potentially play a
significant role in the outcome of the sentencing process but that this potential has often been
overlooked). One of us has looked at another important, and heretofore ignored, mental health
related aspect of the Guidelines: the therapeutic jurisprudential implications of the Guidelines
that encourage defendants to testify against, or in more common parlance, "turn rat on," their
codefendants. See Gould, supra note 1 (questioning the practice of coercing defendants to turn
state's evidence on each other in return for lesser sentences and using evidence of uncharged
or acquitted crimes to boost sentences).
21. See THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B.
Wexler ed., 1990); ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J.
Winick eds., 1991); David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 27 (1992) (advocating the creation of an
interdisciplinary field combining law and behavioral science to supplant the traditional
analytical approach to mental health law); David B. Wexler, Justice, Mental Health, and
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 517 (1992) (detailing how an appreciation
of the mental health disciplines can contribute to a more just legal system); 1 PERLIN, supra
note 8, § 1.05A (Supp. 1994) (describing recent works on therapeutic jurisprudence); Michael
L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence? 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993)
(exploring the role of the law as a therapeutic agent); Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual Basis of Mental Disability Law, 20
N. ENG. J. CRIM. & Crv. CONFINEMENT 369 (1994) (describing the problems of "sanism" and
"pretextuality" in modem criminal law).
22. The Guidelines are discussed in more depth in PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note
10, at 165-70.
23. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-67 (1989) (discussing the problems
associated with indeterminate sentencing and the resulting unfairness).
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-742 & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988 & Supp. V 1994). See
[Vol 22:431
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measure of regularity and uniformity in federal sentencing procedures and
provide for a more efficient and just sentencing system.25 Under this law,
a Sentencing Commission (Commission) was created 6 and was mandated
to promulgate Guidelines in accordance with the Act.27 The constitution-
ality of these Guidelines-a binding set of rules that courts must use in
imposing sentences--was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court in
Mistretta v. United States.
29
The sentencing structure set up under the Guidelines uses a mathemati-
cal calculation to arrive at the presumptive sentence.3" Within the
permissible sentencing range, the judge must determine an appropriate
sentence, consistent with the concerns and purposes of the Act, including:
the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics
of the defendant, the need to achieve the recognized purposes of sentencing,
the kinds of sentences available, pertinent policy statements, the need to
generally Stephen Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is
Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 833 (1992) (discussing the Guidelines, the
problem of disparity in sentencing, and proposed remedies).
25. Some states also adopted determinate sentencing laws. See, e.g., State v. Allert, 815
P.2d 752, 759 (Wash. 1991) (discussing the sentencing guidelines and holding that a
combination of depression, personality disorder, and alcoholism did not justify exceptional
sentence). For a careful opinion considering the appropriate scope of discretion in unusual
cases, see People v. Watters, 595 N.E.2d 1369, 1377-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (discussing the
history of criminal punishment and whether mandatory sentencing should apply to a sexual
offender who is mentally ill).
The state caselaw on mandatory sentencing and mental disability is scant. But see Barret
v. State, 772 P.2d 559, 571 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (finding that although mental illness was
the cause of the defendant's criminal escape, such a finding did not automatically require a
reduction of the presumptive sentence); Lorenzo v. State, 483 So. 2d 790, 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that the trial court erred in increasing the defendant's sentence under the
state's mentally disordered sex offenders program); State v. Alexander, 591 So. 2d 1029, 1030
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (determining that a lower sentence was not justified absent a finding
that sexual offenders had strong motivation to be rehabilitated); Commonwealth v. Larkin, 542
A.2d 1324 (Pa. 1988) (finding that the defendant, who was found guilty but mentally ill, was
not entitled to a reduction in the mandatory minimum sentence).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (Supp. V 1994).
27. It § 994(a)(1).
28. See id. § 994(b)(2) (setting guidelines for the Commission to use when determining
maximum sentences).
29. 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). See generally Nagel, supra note 2, at 906-13 (explaining
the bases for Mistretta decision); Black, supra note 2, at 787 (noting that the decision was
highly controversial); Myrna Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women,
and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 905, 925-26 (1993) (discussing Mistretta and the subsequent
implementation of the Guidelines); Christina C. Montgomery, Social and Schematic Injustice:
The Treatment of Offender Personal Characteristics Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
20 N. ENG. J. CRIM. & Civ. CONFNEMENT 27, 31 (1993) (discussing Mistretta).
30. Gould, supra note 1, at 850.
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avoid unwarranted disparities among similarly situated defendants, and the
need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense." The enabling
statute specifically mandates that the sentencing judge consider the history
and characteristics of the defendant and the nature and circumstances of the
offense.32 In practice, the phrase "relevant information," as used within
the Guidelines, has a "particular, rigid meaning and application, 33 and
judges are generally not free to use such information to fashion a sentence
outside the boundaries set by the mathematical sentencing equation.34
It is generally accepted that there are four major purposes of sentenc-
ing: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 35 Through-
out history, one or the other of these purposes has dominated sentencing
theory and practice.36 At the heart of each new sentencing philosophy is
a series of goals that embrace the current favored purpose. At different
times, the legislature,37 the sentencing judge,38 or various other adminis-
trative groups39 have been entrusted with the primary responsibility of
fulfilling sentencing goals.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7) (1988).
32. Id. § 3553(a)(1); see United States v. Duarte, 901 F.2d 1498, 1500-01 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) a court must consider correspondence describing the
defendant's history); Miller & Freed, supra note 5, at 4 (searching for a framework to guide
courts in the consideration of a defendant's characteristics under 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
33. Gould, supra note 1, at 853; see 18 U.S.C. app. 4, § lBI.3(2) (Supp. V 1994)
(outlining the use of information specified by the applicable guideline to determine a sentence).
34. Gould, supra note 1, at 853.
35. See Nagel, supra note 2, at 887 (compiling an excellent review of sentencing theory).
36. Id.
37. Congress has met this responsibility by creating the Commission and by passing
legislation that delineates mandatory minimum sentences for certain crimes.
38. Federal district judges were the prime arbiters of divining sentences under the
indeterminate sentencing system in effect prior to the implementation of the Guidelines. As
long as sentences were within the broad ranges set down by statute, they were essentially
unreviewable by the appellate courts. See United States v. Bright, 710 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th
Cir. 1982) (indicating that sentencing courts have broad discretion in imposing sentences, but
the power of a appellate courts is limited to determining whether discretion was actually
exercised); United States v. Barbara, 683 F.2d 164, 166 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that the
imposition of the maximum sentence allowed by a plea agreement, when the sentencing
judge's articulated rationale for the punishment was to exact retribution for the attorney-
defendant's abuse of professional trust, did not fit any of the "few exceptions to the rule that
a sentencing decision by a district judge is unreviewable if it is within the statutory limits");
United States v. Dace, 502 F.2d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 1974) (upholding consecutive sentences for
mail fraud because these "heavy" sentences did not constitute a manifest or gross abuse of
discretion).
39. Under the present sentencing system, the Commission and perhaps the United States
Attorney fulfill this role. Under an indeterminate sentencing system, the parole boards function
in this way, by determining when an inmate is rehabilitated enough to be released from the
correctional institution.
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The Commission began its work at a time when enthusiasm for
rehabilitation theory was waning.40 Several studies had been conducted
indicating that criminal rehabilitation was a dead-end goal." Public outcry
over increased violence and crime increased the pressure on lawmakers to
move away from indeterminate sentencing,4 which was believed to
produce disparate sentences, and toward a "just desserts" sentencing
rationale.43  The just desserts sentencing theory imputes a ranking of
40. See Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393,
395 (1991) (contending that reform was stimulated by empirical studies that demonstrated the
ineffectiveness of rehabilitation efforts); Karin Bornstein, 5K2.0 Departures for 5H Individual
Characteristics: A Backdoor Out of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 24 CoLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 135, 138-140 (1992-93) (stating that contemporary scholarship and public opinion
concerning the system's "softness" on crime combined to undermine support for the reha-
bilitative theory); Nagel, supra note 2, at 884, 895-97 (citing empirical studies which suggest
that rehabilitation theory undermines "equal justice under the law").
41. See Douglas S. Lipton et al., THE EFFECrnVENESS OF CORRECrIONAL TREATMENT:
A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975) (promoting the "Nothing Works"
theory). Later, a coauthor of the book, Professor Robert Martinson, renounced his views by
affirming the virtues of probation as a rehabilitative method. Robert Martinson & Judith
Wilks, Save Parole Supervision, 41 FED. PROBATION 23 (1977). Two years later, he published
a study in which he found "startling results" of rehabilitative treatment programs. See Robert
Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note Of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 254-255 (1979) (evaluating statistics that suggest the effectiveness of
a treatment program depends on the conditions under which the program is conducted, rather
than the substance of the program).
Although the dominant congressional and public perception was that all social scientists
had condemned rehabilitation as an idea that could not work, more sophisticated correctional
rehabilitative research continued with some positive results. See generally Paul Gendreau &
Robert R. Ross, Revivification of Rehabilitation.: Evidence From the 1980s, 4 JUST. Q. 349
(1987) (conducting an extensive review of offender rehabilitation programs and theories and
concluding that offender rehabilitation is an attainable goal).
42. With indeterminate sentencing, an offender is sentenced to a "flexible sentence," in
which the length of actual incarceration is handed down by the sentencing judge in terms of
a minimum-maximum range. The actual amount of time served is determined by both
conditional "good time" early releases (approved by the correctional facility administration)
and periodic evaluations of the prisoner's overall rehabilitation (as determined by the parole
board). Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 435 n.94 (1992). In
other words, for an indeterminate sentence of two to four years, the inmate must serve at least
two years, but depending upon his or her behavior within the facility and upon parole hearing
determinations, he may serve anywhere from two to four years in the facility. Parole boards
also determine if a prisoner may be transferred to a less restrictive correctional program.
Under this model, it is believed that wardens and the parole boards are in the best position to
determine when the prisoner is rehabilitated enough to resume living outside of the correctional
facility. Id.
43. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 15 (1988) (contending that the "just desserts"
approach forced drafters of the Guidelines to reach a compromise).
1995]
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criminal behaviors by severity and applies a similarly ranked order of
punishments. Thus, in theory, the just desserts system of sentencing
advocates punishing those who violate the rights of others in accordance
with their individual level of blameworthiness 4 and in this way satisfies
the public hunger for the expression of communal blame upon the
culpable.45  Thus, the criminal conduct is punished without regard to
individual characteristics or circumstances.
Ill. The Choice of Mental Disability Language
46
The Guidelines state that a downward departure is appropriate when
the defendant suffers "from significantly reduced mental capacity. 47 The
use of the modifier "significantly" suggests that the drafters sought to limit
application of this provision to only the most mentally impaired defendants.
This view tracks public sentiment, which continues to endorse the
eighteenth century "wild beast" test48 as the appropriate means of assess-
ing criminal responsibility; this view is also consistent with Congress's
decision in 1984 to enact a more restrictive version of the discredited 1843
M'Naghten rules following public outrage over the Hinckley acquittal.49
44. Nagel, supra note 2, at 898.
45. See Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
34 ARiz. L. REv. 743, 748 (1992) (arguing that the notion of culpability is essential to a "just
desserts" approach to criminal punishment).
46. Offender characteristics are split between the Guidelines and policy statements. The
criminal history provisions are contained within the Guidelines and the noncriminal personal
history provisions, including consideration of 5K21.3 (mental and emotional history), are
relegated to policy statements. According to the Department of Justice's Prosecutorial
Handbook on Sentencing Guidelines, this means that they are only "advisory and non-binding."
See Miller & Freed, supra note 5, at 3. But see Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 201
(1992) (holding policy statement to be an authoritative guide to the meaning of the applicable
guideline).
The Commission published no evidence to document or substantiate the "not ordinarily
relevant" language added to the policy statement. The Commission also did not conduct a
study of federal or state judicial practice on the influence of mental condition on sentencing.
The Commission offered no reasons pursuant to 28 USC § 994(p) to support its offender
characteristics policy statement when the initial guidelines were submitted in May 1987. Id.
at 4. In its Supplemental Report to Initial Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements
of June 18, 1987, the Commission described many aspects of research and philosophy
concerning the Guidelines Manual, but said virtually nothing about offender characteristics
polices. Id.
47. MANUAL, supra note 3, § 5K2.13.
48. See Caton F. Roberts et al., Implicit Theories of Criminal Responsibility Decision
Making and the Insanity Defense, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 207, 223-24 (1987) (concluding
that the public continues to use the early English concept of "total insanity").
49. PERLiN, INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 10, at 138-43 (discussing the public's
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Courts regularly find that, to qualify for a downward departure, a
defendant's condition must be "extraordinary" or "atypical." Thus, in
United States v. Vela5" the Fifth Circuit reversed a downward departure in
the case of a defendant subjected to incestuous childhood sexual abuse that
was admittedly "shocking and repulsive" because that factor, while
egregious, was insufficiently extraordinary to support such a departure."
And in United States v. Lara,52 Judge Metzner dissented from the Second
Circuit's affirmance of a downward departure in the case of a "delicate
looking" bisexual young man, arguing that susceptibility to physical and
sexual attack in prison is not sufficiently unusual as to rise to the level of
atypicality required by the Guidelines. 3
The Guidelines also require that the defendant's "reduced mental
capacity" not be caused by the "voluntary use of drugs or other intoxi-
cants."54 This exclusion suggests that the drafters specifically sought to
limit application of the provision to those who could not be deemed
"responsible" for their mental state. 5 Indeed, appellate courts have
regularly ruled that downward departures are precluded even in cases in
which the defendants successfully completed postarrest drug rehabilita-
tion.56
These limitations on the use of the mental disability defense parallel
both the attitude of legislators57 and the attitude of jurors, who consistently
frustrations with the insanity defense and the passage of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1985))).
50. 927 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1991).
51. Id. at 198-99. See generally Jean H. Shuttleworth, Recent Developments, Childhood
Abuse as a Mitigating Factor in Federal Sentencing: The Ninth Circuit Versus the United
States Sentencing Commission, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (citing Vela as a case that holds
that childhood abuse is relevant in certain circumstances). On atypicality, see United States
v. Studley, 907 F.2d 254, 258 (Ist Cir. 1990) (holding that a downward departure based on the
mental or emotional condition of a defendant is only appropriate when the particular condition
is "atypical").
52. 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990).
53. Id. at 608 (Metzner, J., dissenting).
54. MANUAL, supra note 3, § 5K2.13.
55. See United States v. Tolliver, No. 91-4130, 1993 WL 100067, at *8-9 (6th Cir. Apr.
5, 1993) (rejecting downward departure because of defendant's "voluntary" decision to use
drugs).
56. United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956,963 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (vacating defendant's
downward departure sentence and remanding for resentencing because drug rehabilitation is
not a mitigating circumstance according to the Commission); United States v. Martin, 938 F.2d
162, 163 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant's postarrest drug rehabilitation efforts
provided no basis for downward departure because the court lacked the power to deviate from
sentencing guidelines).
57. PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 10, at 73-142,417-45; see State v. Duckworth,
496 So. 2d 624, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (ruling that trial judge was proper in rehabilitating
juror by explaining the law on insanity and culpability after juror had stated that defendant was
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refuse to treat mental illness as a mitigating factor in death penalty cases. 5
In short, the Guidelines present an extraordinarily cramped reading of
"mental disability" as a mitigator, a reading that is totally consonant with
public and legislative attitudes toward an exculpatory nonresponsibility
defense and toward mental disability as a mitigator in death penalty
sentencing.
IV. Sanism and Pretextuality
A. Introduction
We contend that it is impossible to truly understand the developments
discussed in this Article without an understanding of what we refer to as
"sanism" and "pretextuality." These constructs, we believe, best illuminate
the underlying issues.
B. Sanism59
"Sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character
of other irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing social
attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.60 It infects
both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices.61 Sanism is largely
invisible and socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon stereo-
type, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and is sustained and
perpetuated by our use of alleged "ordinary common sense" and by
responsible for actions if he "wanted to do them," instead of excusing for cause); J.R. Balkin,
The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 238 (1990) (discussing suggestion by
Hinckley prosecutor to jurors that "if Hinckley had emotional problems, they were largely his
own fault").
58. See Perlin, supra note 12, at 259 (discussing belief that jurors treat mental illness as
an aggravating factor, not a mitigating factor, in many death penalty cases).
59. The text accompanying notes 60-64 infra is generally adapted from Perlin & Dorfman,
supra note 17, at 51-52.
60. The classic study is GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1955). On
the way that sanism incorporates a multistep "prejudice assimilation model," see Keri A.
Gould, "Madness in the Streets" Rides the Waves of Sanism, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 567,
574-81 (1992) (reviewing RAEL ISAAC & VIRGINIA ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: How
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL (1990), and describing its
treatment of sanism).
61. The term "sanism" was, to the best of our knowledge, coined by Dr. Morton
Birnbaum. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on its
Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 106-07 (Frank
J. Ayd, Jr. ed., 1974) (developing the concept of sanism by drawing an analogy to racism);
Koe v. Califano, 573 F.2d 761, 764 & n.12 (2d Cir. 1978) (defining sanism).
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heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday
life and in the legal process.
Judges, legislators, attorneys, and lay persons all exhibit sanist traits
and profess sanist attitudes.62 It is no surprise that jurors reflect and
project the conventional morality of the community and that judicial
decisions in all areas of civil and criminal mental disability law continue to
reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes. For example, one important
stereotype is that mental illness can easily be identified by lay persons; this
belief matches up closely to popular media depictions and comports with
our "common sense"' notion of "crazy behavior."'63 Another sanist belief
is that it is-and should be-socially acceptable to use pejorative labels to
describe and single out the mentally ill; this singling out is not problematic
in the way that the use of other pejorative labels to describe women, blacks,
Jews, or homosexuals might be.64
Most of the caselaw is similarly riddled with other sanist stereotypes
and myths. Examples include the omnipresent, obsessive fear of feigned
mental illness65 and the presumption of an absolute linkage between
62. PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 10, at 201,440; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note
17 at 51-52.
63. PERLIN, supra note 8, at 395. See generally State v. Van Horn, 528 So. 2d 529, 530
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing the probative value of lay witnesses' "perceptions of [the
defendant's] normalcy"); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology
of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 599, 727 & n.608 (1989-90)
(discussing the "wild beast" standard in connection with Battalino v. People, 199 P.2d 897, 901
(Colo. 1948)); Walter Bromberg & Hervey M. Cleckley, The Medico-Legal Dilemma, 42 J.
CRI1. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 729, 738 (1952) (contrasting lay perceptions of "insanity" with
actual attributes of schizophrenia).
64. Perlin, Sanism, supra note 10, at 395. On the ways that negative characterization of
mental illness and the mentally ill are used by prosecutors in criminal trial summations, see
Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Negative Characterization or Description of Defendant, by
Prosecutor During Summation of Criminal Trial, as Ground for Reversal, New Trial, or
Mistrial-Modern Cases, 88 A.L.R. 4th 8, 91-95 (1991) (reviewing cases in which the
prosecutor's characterization of the defendant as mentally deranged did not require reversal on
appeal); Randy V. Cargill, "Hard Blows" Versus "Foul Ones": Restrictions on Trial
Counsel's Closing Argument, ARMY L., Jan. 1991, at 20, 26 (giving examples of permissible
and impermissible characterizations of defendants). On the descriptions used by members of
Congress to describe mentally disabled individuals ("the demented," "the deranged," "lunatics,"
"madmen," "idiots and morons," and "psychopaths and nincompoops"), see Motion for Leave
to File and Brief for the New Jersey Dep't of the Public Advocate, Division of Mental health
Advocacy and American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey as Amici Curiae at 17, United
States Dep't of Treasury v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556 (1986) (No. 84-1904) (quoting various
passages from the legislative debate on the 1968 gun control legislation).
65. See PERLIN, INsANrrY DEFENSE, supra note 10, at 236-47,402-03 (discussing public's
constant fear of defendants' faking an insanity defense); see also Lynch v. Overholser, 369
U.S. 705, 715 (1962) (holding that a criminal defendant accused of passing bad checks is not
compelled to be confined to a mental hospital unless he relies on the insanity defense and is
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mental illness and dangerousness.66 Underlying these myths is one
constant: the extraordinary fear of mentally disabled criminal defen-
dants.67
In this environment, it is easy to understand how evidence of mental
illness--ostensibly introduced for mitigating purposes-can instead be
construed by judges as an aggravating factor.68 In one notorious Florida
case, for example, a trial judge concluded that due to the defendant's mental
disability (paranoid schizophrenia manifested by hallucinations in which he"saw" others in a "yellow haze",) "the only assurance society can receive
that [the defendant] never again commits to another human being what he
did to [the brutally murdered decedent] is that the ultimate sentence of
death be imposed. 69
acquitted on that ground); United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting
that the standard for committing an acquitted criminal defendant to a mental hospital is
preponderance of the evidence); Peter Margulies, The "Pandemonium Between the Mad and
the Bad:" Procedures for the Commitment and Release of Insanity Acquittees After Jones v.
United States, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 793, 806-07 n.85 (1984) (contrasting an attempt to fake
insanity with an act of collusion to defraud an insurance company).
66. Perlin, Sanism, supra note 10, at 402; see Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365
(1983) (finding that the government may confine a criminal defendant to a mental hospital
even if the defendant establishes that he is not guilty by reason of insanity); Overholser v.
O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (reasoning that the petitioner's release would
be premature and put the public at risk); PERLIN, INSANrrY DEFENSE, supra note 10, at 161-71
(discussing the public's lack of faith in psychiatric defenses to criminal behavior).
67. Successful insanity defendants are perceived as perhaps the "most despised" and most
"morally repugnant" group of individuals in society. See Deborah C. Scott et al., Monitoring
Insanity Acquittees: Connecticut's Psychiatric Security Review Board, 41 HOSp. & COMMUN.
PSYCHIATRY 980, 982 (1990) (describing the difficulties psychiatric review boards face when
contemplating release of inmates); see also James W. Ellis, The Consequences of the Insanity
Defense: Proposals to Reform Post-Acquittal Commitment Laws, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 961
(1986) (noting that legislators are searching for alternatives to the insanity defense in the wake
of the Hinckley acquittal); Tony Rogers, Juries' Reluctance to Accept Insanity Pleas Linked
to Fear, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES, April 18, 1993, at A18 (describing the reluctance of jurors
to acquit a defendant on the basis of insanity).
68. Ellen F. Berkman, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital
Sentencing, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 291, 299-300 (1989).
69. Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 885 (Fla. 1979). The Florida Supreme Court reversed
this sentence, however, finding that it was reversible error for the trial court to consider the
possibility that the defendant would commit similar acts in the future when imposing the death
penalty. Id.
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C. Pretextuaity7 °
Sanist attitudes often lead to pretextual decisions. By this we mean
simply that factfinders accept-either implicitly or explicitly-testimonial
dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (frequently meretricious)
decisionmaking, specifically when witnesses, especially expert witnesses,
show a "high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to
achieve desired ends."'" This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all
participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the
law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase judging,
and at times, perjurious or corrupt testifying. The reality is well known to
frequent consumers of judicial services in this area: to mental health
advocates and other public defender, legal aid, and legal service lawyers
assigned to represent patients and mentally disabled criminal defendants; to
prosecutors and state attorneys assigned to represent hospitals; to judges that
regularly hear such cases; to expert and lay witnesses; and most impor-
tantly, to the mentally disabled person involved in the litigation itself.
The pretexts of the forensic mental health system are reflected both in
the testimony of forensic experts and in the decisions of legislators and fact-
finders. 2 Experts frequently testify in accordance with their own self-
referential concepts of "morality"73 and openly subvert statutory and
caselaw criteria that impose rigorous behavioral standards as predicates for
70. This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons With
Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone? 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 29-34 (1993-94).
71. Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary
Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991); see Charles Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police
Perjury, I1 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 839, 839 (1974) (suggesting that for the most part police
perjury is ignored by the judiciary).
72. See Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D.D.C. 1987) (noting that although
the District of Columbia Code contained a provision that allowed patients to seek periodic
review of commitment or independent psychiatric evaluation, not a single patient had ever
exercised that right). The significance of Streicher is discussed carefully in Arlene Kanter,
Abandoned but Not Forgotten: The Illegal Confinement of Elderly People in State Psychiatric
Institutions, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC'L CHANGE 273, 304-06 (1991).
73. See Cassia Spohn & Julia Homey, "The Law's the Law, But Fair Is Fair:" Rape
Shield Laws and Officials' Assessments of Sexual History Evidence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 139
(1991) (stating that a legal reform that contradicts deeply held beliefs may result either in open
defiance of the law or in a surreptitious attempt to modify the law); H. RICHARD UVILLER,
TEMPERED ZEAL 116-18 (1988) (arguing that the police sanction perjury in cases in which the
Supreme Court has imposed constitutional rules that do not comport with the officers' "own
idea of fair play"). But see Tracey Maclin, Seeing the Constitution from the Backseat of a
Police Squad Car (reviewing H.RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL, 70 B.U. L. REV. 543,
580-82 (1990)) (criticizing Uviller's view).
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commitment74 or that articulate functional standards as prerequisites for an
incompetency to stand trial finding.75 Often this testimony is further
warped by a heuristic bias. Expert witnesses-like the rest of us-succumb
to the meretricious allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their thinking
and employ such heuristic gambits as the vividness effect or attribution
theory in their testimony.76
Testimony is then weighed and evaluated by frequently sanist fact-
finders.' Judges and jurors, both consciously and unconsciously, fre-
quently rely on reductionist, prejudice-driven stereotypes in their decision-
making, thus subordinating statutory and caselaw standards as well as the
legitimate interests of the mentally disabled persons that are the subject of
the litigation. The process is further contaminated by judges' predisposi-
tions to employ the same sorts of heuristics as the expert witnesses
employ.7" Even when confronted with a clear body of contrary empirical
evidence, judges pretextually decide cases based on their vision of the
socially appropriate result.79
In a series of other articles, we have attempted to demonstrate how
sanism and pretextuality drive other aspects of the mental disability law
system.80 As we discuss below, we believe these same pernicious forces
are equally at play here.
74. Perlin, supra note 11, at 641-59.
75. See People v. Doan, 366 N.W.2d 593, 598 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that at trial
expert testified that defendant was "out in left field" and went "bananas").
76. Perlin, supra note 70, at 21; Perlin supra note 11, at 629, 661, 667; see Michael Saks
& Robert Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial By Heuristics, 15
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 123, 130-31 (1980) (recognizing human cognitive abilities are limited and
that not all information can be processed successfully and that, therefore, experts in a variety
of fields simplify the process by employing heuristics).
77. Perlin, Sanism, supra note 10, at 397; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 17, at 51-52.
78. See Perlin, supra note 11, at 664-67 (noting that judges are willing to rely primarily
on their own personal observation of the defendant's demeanor at trial when assessing the
defendant's mental state).
79. See Gacy v. Welbom, 994 F.2d 305, 317 (7th Cir.) (affirming the defendant's
conviction in a notorious multiple homicide case notwithstanding body of evidence concluding
jurors do not understand capital punishment instructions), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 269 (1993).
80. Perlin, Sanism, supra note 10, at 391-406; Perlin, supra note 11, at 636-39; Perlin,
supra note 70, at 29-43; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 17, at 51-53; Gould, supra note 60, at
570, 576.
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V. The Caselaw
As Professor Stephen Schulhofer, a consultant to the Commission, has
noted:
[I]n many courts, at the Department of Justice and at the Commission
itself there has been a pervasive assumption that departures represent a
threat to the Guidelines system or that they should be used sparingly and
only as a last resort.
[Appellate decisions have thus] sent a message to lower courts and
contributed to an atmosphere in which departure is considered out of the
question under virtually any circumstances."81
This message is even more pronounced in cases involving mentally disabled
criminal defendants.
Departures from the Guidelines based on mental disability have been
few, and more often than not, have come in cases in which a defendant's
mental state more closely approximates that of a pbtentially successful
insanity plea.82 In United States v. Speight,"3 for instance, the court
found that a defendant (convicted of drug and firearm offenses) who
suffered from schizophrenia and other emotional disturbances met all the
criteria of the Guidelines and that a sentence reduction was thus war-
ranted. 4 In United States v. Ruklick5 the court emphasized that, under
the Guidelines, it was not necessary to find the defendant's reduced mental
capacity amounted to "but-for causation" in order to reduce a sentence, as
long as his diminished mental capacity "comprised a contributing factor in
the commission of the offense.
' 86
81. Schulhofer, supra note 24, at 863-64.
82. See United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 603 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding departure
from Guidelines based on defendant's likely "extreme vulnerability" in a correctional facility);
United States v. Cotto, 793 F. Supp. 64, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that the defendant's near
retardation, vulnerability, efforts at rehabilitation, and incompetence warranted downward
departure). There are limits to the use of mental disability as a reductive element. See
MANUAL, supra note 3, § 5H1.3 ("Mental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant
in determining whether a sentence should be outside the guidelines, except as provided in [the
general provisions of Chapter 5].").
83. 726 F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C. 1989).
84. lad at 867-68; see also United States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 1991)
(affirming the trial court's grant of a downward departure under the clearly erroneous
standard); United States v. Adonis, 744 F. Supp. 336, 341-42 (D.D.C. 1990) (allowing
downward departure because of the defendant's abnormally low intelligence); cf. United States
v. Doering, 909 F.2d 392, 394-95 (9th Cir. 1990) (prohibiting upward departure when evidence
reflected need for psychiatric care).
85. 919 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1990).
86. Id at 97-98; cf. United States v. Gentry, 925 F.2d 186, 188-89 (7th Cir. 1991)
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Not all of the remaining cases exhibit sanist characteristics, however.
Several reflect the work product of thoughtful judges who have carefully
weighed mental disability testimony and applied this evidence sensitively
to the cases before them. Most recently, in United States v. Cantu87 the
Ninth Circuit reversed a trial court's refusal to grant a downward departure
to a defendant suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. The court
carefully construed the Guidelines to include emotional disorders and
organic syndromes. In the court's view, the purpose of the Guidelines is
to enable federal judges to show "lenity toward defendants whose ability to
make reasoned decisions is impaired.""8  Because the defendant's post-
traumatic stress disorder had the capacity to "distort or suppress the
formation of reasoned decisions," or "impair the formation of reasoned
judgments," the defendant had thus qualified for a downward departure.89
These cases are the exception. Generally, applications for downward
departures are summarily rejected. In some cases uncontroverted evidence
of major depression, 0 manic depression,9' severe emotional stress,92 or
a history of psychosis93 is rejected as a grounds for departure. In others,
(holding that the sentencing court must assess whether the defendant possesses "significantly
reduced mental incapacity" in justifying downward departure from Guidelines) (emphasis in
original).
87. 12 F.3d 1506 (9th Cir. 1993).
88. Id. at 1512.
89. Id at 1512-13. Other courts have also carefully considered defendants' clinical
conditions in assessing the propriety of a downward departure. See United States v. Garza-
Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming downward departure because the
defendant suffered from panic disorder and agoraphobia); United States v. Lewinson, 988 F.2d
1005, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming downward departure despite the defendant's drug use
because such use had ended before the crime was completed); United States v. Chatman, 986
F.2d 1446, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (vacating the defendant's sentence because the trial court
failed to adequately consider the defendant's mental disability); United States v. McCarthy, 840
F. Supp. 1404, 1412-13 (D. Colo. 1993) (granting a downward departure to a defendant who
had been in a "confused mental state" after being expelled from school and then learning of
his friend's death); United States v. McMurray, 833 F. Supp. 1454, 1484 (D. Neb. 1993)
(granting downward departure to a defendant suffering from a bipolar disorder and recognizing
that the defendant's drug use was an effect of his disease and not the cause); United States v.
Cotto, 793 F. Supp. 64, 67-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting a downward departure to a defendant
who was "vulnerable" and near retardation); see also Commonwealth v. Sheridan, 502 A.2d
694, 696-97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (affirming downward departure in part because of the
defendant's "weak ego structure").
90. E.g. United States v. Kimball, No. 92-30133, 1993 WL 186624, at *2 (9th Cir. June
1, 1993); United States v. Frazier, 979 F.2d 1227, 1230 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Eagan, 965 F.2d 887, 893 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gudal, No. 92-30014, 1992 WL
354551, at *4 (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 1992).
91. E.g., State v. Walker, 393 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
92. E.g., State v. Rogers, 770 P.2d 180, 182 (Wash. 1989).
93. E.g., United States v. Regan, 989 F.2d 44, 48 (1st Cir. 1993).
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evidence of a failed insanity defense is used as a justification for a refusal
to enter a downward departure.94 The entry of the insanity plea has been
seen as evidence of a failure to demonstrate contrition (presumably because
the plea entry denied legal responsibility for the offense), and that lack of
contrition has been seen as a failure to accept responsibility, thus bringing
the defendant out of the ambit of another Guideline (3E1.1), which
provides for a downward departure if the defendant "clearly demonstrates
a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his
criminal conduct. 95  As one court put it, the defendant's entry of an
insanity plea-containing in it the admission that he committed the
underlying act (an armed robbery)-did not rise to the level of "contrition
necessary ... for acceptance of responsibility."9 6 In yet another case, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed a denial of a sentence reduction in a failed insanity
case when the defendant stated he was "very ashamed because [he] could
not control [his] illness and [was] sorry [he could] not continue the
[psychiatric] treatment that was necessary to bring him back to reality."97
In other cases, evidence of past insanity acquittals has been seen as an
aggravating circumstance worthy of an upward departure.98 And even
when conviction is followed by commitment to a federal medical center for
psychiatric care and treatment,99 that level of mental illness has not been
seen as sufficient to warrant a downward departure."°
Generally, decisions by trial courts to reject downward departures are
merely summarily affirmed, especially when the underlying crime is violent
and the defendant's violent criminal record raised the possibility that he
would be a threat to public safety,1"' or when the court simply found the
defendant's disability too insignificant as to warrant such a reduction,,'
94. E.g., United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 711-12 (10th Cir. 1990).
95. Id. at 712.
96. Id.
97. United States v. Reno, 992 F.2d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 1993).
98. E.g., United States v. Medved, 905 F.2d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v.
McKenley, 895 F.2d 184, 186 (4th Cir. 1990).
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1985) (detailing the procedures for hospitalization of a
convicted defendant).
100. United States v. Hunter, 985 F.2d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 1993), vacated as moot, 1
F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1993).
101. E.g., United States v. Braxton, 19 F.3d 1385, 1386 (lth Cir. 1994); United States
v. Fairman, 947 F.2d 1479, 1480 (1lth Cir. 1991); United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 592
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1503 (1992); United States v. Wilson, No. 89-3360,
1989 WL 149948, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1038 (1990).
102. E.g., United States v. Regan, 989 F.2d 44, 47-48 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v.
Tucker, 986 F.2d 278, 280 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 76 (1993); United States
v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190, 193-94 (6th Cir. 1991).
A recent case has also explored the relationship between the Guidelines and other federal
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or when the court did not find defendant's "extraordinary postarrest efforts"
at drug rehabilitation sufficient to warrant such a reduction,103 or when the
court felt that the defendant did not take sufficient responsibility for his role
in the criminal offenses in question."° And in at least one case, it has
been held that a defendant's "dangerous mental state" could make an
upward departure appropriate. 105
Several cases deal with the application of the Guidelines to defendants
suffering from compulsive gambling disorder. In United States v.
Harris,1' 6 for instance, a downward departure was denied because the
defendant failed to prove that he suffered from a pathological gambling
disorder.'" The decision was based in part upon the defendant's "highly
sophisticated" scheme for defrauding banks.103  In United States v.
Libutti'09 a downward departure was granted for the defendant's claustro-
phobia disorder (under a 5H1.3 departure for medical and emotional
conditions)"0 and was denied for his compulsive gambling disorder
(a 5K2.13 departure)."' Taling it another step, in United States v.
Katzenstein1 the court concluded that a departure would not be warrant-
ed unless the defendant could either demonstrate that total rehabilitation had
been achieved or that there was a lack of correlation between compulsive
gambling disorder and increased propensity for criminal activity."13
statutes governing the provision of mental health care to prisoners during their period of
sentence and the care of competent persons suffering from mental disease prior to sentencing.
See United States v. Roberts, 915 F.2d 889, 891-92 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1122 (1991) (finding no error in trial judge sentencing defendant provisionally pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 4244(c) rather than in accordance with sentencing guidelines). Another case has
explored the relationship between diminished mental capacity and subsequent revocation of
probation. See United States v. Sylvester, No. CR-90-177-2-FR, 1994 WL 92035, at *1 (D.
Or. Mar. 11, 1994) (reconsidering revocation in case of defendant originally given downward
departure because of "mental/emotional dysfunctions").
103. United States v. Zeigler, 1 F.3d 1044, 1048-49 (10th Cir. 1993).
104. United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993).
105. United States v. Hines, 26 F.3d 1469, 1477-78 (9th Cir. 1994).
106. No. S192 Cr. 455 (CSH), 1994 WL 683429 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1994).
107. Id. at *16.
108. Id.
109. No. CRIM. 92-611 (JBS), 1994 WL 774647 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 1994).
110. Id. at *10.
111. Id. at 15.
112. No. 90-CR-272, 1991 WL 24386 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1991).
113. Id. at *2; see also United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
that defendant's compulsive gambling did not warrant downward departure). See generally
Lawrence Lustberg, Sentencing the Sick: Compulsive Gambling as the Basis for a Downward
Departure Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 2 SErON HALL. . SPORT L. 51 (1992)
(providing a thorough overview of compulsive gambling and mental disability departures under
the Guidelines).
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Similarly, in State v. O'Brien"' the court rejected the defendant's applica-
tion for a downward departure in large part because of the "sophistication
and planning" of his criminal activity: theft by swindle, through which the
defendant defrauded others into forming car leasing joint ventures with
him. s  And in United States v. Rosen,1 6 the trial court found that
because the crime was committed to pay off a home equity loan-a loan
that was needed to pay the defendant's gambling debts-rather than to
support gambling directly, the crime consequently resulted from personal
financial and economic difficulties, grounds determined by the Commission
to be irrelevant to the sentencing process." 7
Another important theme runs through each of the reported cases. In
each one, without exception, the U.S. Attorney's Office opposed the use of
mental disability as a mitigating factor.1 In at least one case, the Office
argued that a defendant's need for psychiatric treatment justified an upward
departure." 9 This is especially important because the role of prosecutors
has been "greatly enhanced" in the entire federal sentencing process. 20
This decision by the Justice Department mocks the spirit of the Guidelines
and exposes federal prosecutors as inflexible gatekeepers, interested solely
in insuring maximum prison time for all defendants convicted on federal
charges no matter how serious their mental disability.1
2'
114. 429 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 1988).
115. Id. at 296.
116. 896 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1990).
117. Id. at 790 n.2. But see United States v. Harris, No. S192 Cr. 455 (CSH), 1994 WL
683429, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1994) (citing two unreported cases, United States v. Berube
and United States v. Heizman, in which the district courts granted the defendants' downward
departure requests on the basis of diminished capacity caused by pathological gambling).
118. We recognize that there may be some methodological problems here. It is certainly
possible that prosecutors have agreed to downward departures in unpublished cases. It is also
possible that prosecutors have agreed to plea bargains in cases in which they thought the
defendant's mental condition justified a more lenient sentence. The universe of published
cases, however, reveals these findings.
119. United States v. Doering, 909 F.2d 392, 395 (9th Cir.1990).
120. Jack McCall, The Emperor's New Clothes: Due Process Considerations Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 60 TENN. L. REV. 467, 496 (1993).
121. For a particularly troubling account, see Eva Rodriguez, Blind Spot in U.S.
Sentencing System: No Allowance Made for Mentally Retarded Defendants, 132 N.J.L.J., Nov.
2, 1992, at 11. Press accounts of such behavior are legion. See Deborah Pines, Heroism Wins
Defendant Reduction in Sentencing, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 1, 1994, at 1, 7 (reporting on United States
v. Acosta, 846 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), and stating that "Judge Lasker rejected
arguments by federal prosecutors that [the defendant's mental] handicap [was a] permissible
grounds for a sentencing reduction").
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VI. Mental Disability and the Guidelines
Cases decided under the Guidelines reflect a lack of understanding by
federal judges of the meaning of mental disability and its role as a potential
sentencing mitigator. In attitudes that strikingly mirror attitudes of jurors
in assessing mental disability in death penalty cases,"2 judges conceptual-
ize mental disability as an "all or nothing" absolute construct,1 3 demand
a showing of mental disability that approximates the amount needed for an
exculpatory insanity defense,124 continue to not "get" distinctions between
mental illness, insanity, and incompetency, repeat sanist myths about
mentally disabled criminal defendants, and engage in pretextual decision-
making.
The ominous spirit of Justice Scalia's partial dissent in Penry v.
Lynaugh--castigating the majority for allowing an "outpouring ... [of]
unfocused sympathy"--looms over many of these cases. Most of the
few cases in which mental disability is seen as a mitigator eerily track the
fact pattern of the few situations in which jurors grudgingly sanction the
use of the insanity defense: when a defendant-especially one who has
previously sought counseling-commits a nonplanful crime. 26
The attitudes expressed in these cases are frequently sanist. For
example, in a recent Sixth Circuit case the court rejected the defendant's
"suicidal tendencies" as a possible basis for a downward departure in an
embezzlement case. 27 The court held that departure would never be
permissible on this basis, because any consideration of such an argument
would lead to "boilerplate" claims and force courts to "separate the wheat
of valid claims from the chaff of disingenuous ones," a "path before which
we give serious pause."' 128 This argument tracks, nearly verbatim, the
reasoning of the Fourth Circuit, which refused to grant a downward
departure in the case of a defendant who had suffered severe childhood
sexual abuse, referring to the "innumerable defendants" that could plead
122. Perlin, supra note 12, at 254-74.
123. PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 10, at 77.
124. An analogy may be drawn here to the way that GBMI (Guilty But Mentally Ill)
statutes in some jurisdiction basically track the language of the more "liberal" Model Penal
Code insanity test, while the more rigid M'Naghten standard is used for insanity evaluations.
PERLIN, supra note 8, § 15.09; PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 10, at 91-95; MICHAEL
L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DIsABmirY § 4.41 (1994).
125. 492 U.S. 302, 359-60 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
126. Perlin, supra note 12, at 245-49 (discussing research reported in White, supra note
14).
127. United States v. Harpst, 949 F.2d 860, 871 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Schulhofer,
supra note 24, at 866 (discussing Harpst).
128. Harpst, 949 F.2d at 871.
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"unstable upbringing" as a potential departure grounds.129
Just as evidence of organic disorder appears more "real" to judges in
insanity cases (than does evidence of psychological disability),130 so does
such evidence appear more "real" in Guidelines cases. In United States v.
Hamilton,'13 the Sixth Circuit affirmed a trial court's refusal to enter a
downward departure in the case of a defendant suffering a "major
depressive episode," on the theory that the Commission was "talking about
things such as a borderline mental intelligence capacity."1 32 The court
concluded that because the defendant was "able to absorb information in the
usual way and to exercise the power of reason," he did not suffer from a
"significantly reduced mental capacity."133
The District of Columbia Circuit has explicitly rejected the admission
of expert testimony on an individual defendant's potential for successful
rehabilitation on two grounds: Another defendant without access to such
expert testimony might be able to make a similar case for leniency, and
reliance on "scientific" predictions could transform sentencing hearings into
an inappropriate "battle of experts. ' '1 4 But as Professor Schulhofer notes
in his critique of this case, a district court always has the capacity to
appoint expert witnesses to aid a defendant at sentencing, an option made
explicitly constitutional in a different context in Ake v.Oklahoma.35
Beyond this, the court's professed concern over sorting out potentially
conflicting expert testimony reveals pretextuality at its worst: Federal
judges are certainly capable of this type of judicial decisionmaking. Indeed,
they must regularly weigh conflicting expert testimony on a variety of
scientific and technical subjects. This approach mirrors perfectly the
behavior of courts in other mental disability law cases, such as the en banc
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Charters,136 a case involving the right
of incompetent-to-stand trial detainees to refuse antipsychotic medication,
where the court "abdicated its responsibility to read, harmonize, distinguish
and analyze social science data on the issues before it. ' 137 This triviali-
zation of social science simultaneously allows courts to more comfortably
seek refuge in allegedly common sense "morality,"' 3' employ heuristic
129. United States v. Daly, 883 F. 313, 319 (4th Cir. 1989).
130. PERLN , INSANrrY DEFENsE, supra note 10, at 252-58.
131. 949 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1991).
132. Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
135. 470 U.S. 68 (1985); see also Schulhofer, supra note 24, at 869 (discussing Ake).
136. 863 F.2d 302, 312-13 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
137. Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions?
Stripping the Facade From United States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 957, 999 (1990).
138. Perlin, supra note 71, at 136-38.
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devices in a wide variety of cases in "uncomfortable" areas of the law, and
use sanist behavior in deciding such cases. 139
Underlying many of the Guidelines cases is a powerful current of
blame: The defendant succumbed to temptation by not resisting drugs or
alcohol, by not overcoming childhood abuse, and so forth. This sense of
blame mirrors courts' sanist impatience with mentally disabled criminal
defendants in general, attributing their problems in the legal process to
"weak character or poor resolve."'"' Thus, we should not be surprised to
learn that a trial judge, responding to a National Center for State Courts
survey, indicated that incompetent-to-stand-trial defendants could have
understood and communicated with their counsel and the court "if they
[had] only wanted."'' Again, one of the leading texts on white collar
crimes sentencing stresses:
Judges consider[] two major concepts pertinent to individual attributes
of the offender: blameworthiness and consequence .... Certain
characteristics of offenders relate to the culpability of or degree of
blameworthiness of the particular defendant. Illustrations include mental
competency .... 142
In addition to the use of sanism, sentencing decisions are also often
pretextual. In the case of a chronically depressed, compulsive gambler
under threats of violence to pay off his debts (apparently from organized
crime figures), the Sixth Circuit justified its rejection of a downward
departure on the grounds that the defendant could have "just said no." The
court moralized: "He had the option of reporting the threats he received to
the authorities, of course, but he chose instead to engage in serious
violations of the law.' '143
Just as judges do not "get" the differences between the differing legal
standards in insanity and incompetency to stand trial cases,' 44 they
similarly do not "get" the difference between either of these statuses and the
139. Perlin, supra note 11, at 669.
140. Id. at 670-71. See generally Bernard Weiner, On Sin Versus Sickness: A Theory
of Perceived Responsibility and Social Motivation, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 957 (1993)
(proposing conceptual system of social motivation to balance societal tendencies that tend to
encourage punishment for those who demonstrate a "lack of effort" or are "responsible" for
their failure).
141. Perlin, supra note 11, at 671 (quoting Keri A. Gould et al., Criminal Defendants
With Trial Disabilities: The Theory and Practice of Competency Assistance 90 (1993)
(unpublished manuscript)); see also Perlin, supra note 11, at 671 nn. 230-31 (citing sources).
142. STANTON WHEELER ET AL, SITING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE
COLLAR CRIMINALS 20-21 (1988).
143. United States v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1991).
144. Perlin, supra note 11, at 679; see also 3 PERLIN, supra note 8, § 14.02 n.7 (citing
sources).
454 [Vol 22:431
1995] Rashomon and the Criminal Law 455
degree of mental capacity needed to justify a downward departure under the
Guidelines. For example, one trial court concluded (in reliance on the
prosecutor's argument) that because the defendant, who was learning
disabled, physically disabled, and of borderline intelligence, was competent
to stand trial and responsible for his act (the distribution of LSD), he was
therefore ineligible for a downward departure under the Guidelines. 45
This decision was affirmed by the First Circuit in an opinion "agree[ing
with] and applaud[ing]" the trial judge's "thoughtful consideration" of the
underlying issues.146
Misunderstandings such as these are likely to be further exacerbated
by the Supreme Court's decision in Godinez v. Moran,147 which held that
the standard for competency to plead guilty or to waive counsel is no
greater than the standard for competency to stand trial. At least one trial
court decision implicitly suggests that Godinez may be a source of greater
future confusion in the area of mental disability and sentencing under the
Guidelines.148  Our reading is that Godinez makes far more likely the
possibility of pretextual decisionmaking under the Guidelines.
VII. A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective
What are the therapeutic jurisprudence implications? Therapeutic
jurisprudence studies the role of the law as a therapeutic agent, recognizing
that substantive rules, legal procedures, and lawyers' roles may have either
therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences, and questioning whether such
rules, procedures, and roles can or should be reshaped so as to enhance
their therapeutic potential without subordinating due process principles. 49
What is the "fit" between the Guidelines and therapeutic jurisprudence?
The rationale of this aspect of the Guidelines is clear: To some extent,
some level of mental disability can serve as a mitigator of sentence in some
cases. But on what theoretical basis is this rationale premised? That a
145. United States v. Lauzon, 938 F.2d 326, 332 (1st Cir. 1991). Lauzon is one of almost
two dozen reported Guidelines cases involving defendants that were so-called "Deadheads,"
followers of the Grateful Dead rock group.
146. Id.
147. 112 S. Ct. 2680 (1993); see Perlin, supra note 12, at 275 (arguing that the decision
will lead to confusion and misunderstanding in the lower courts). See generally 3 PERLIN,
supra note 8, §§ 14.20A, 14.21 (Supp. 1994) (discussing Godinez); PERLIN, supra note 124,
§ 4.13 (discussing Godinez).
148. See United States v. Stevens, No. CRIM.92-184-1, 1993 WL 539125, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 20, 1993) (approving a downward departure in the case of a defendant with "serious
mental health problems").
149. PERLIN, supra note 124, § 5.01; see also sources cited, supra note 21.
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mentally disabled person is less worthy of being punished? That the
retributive basis of punishment is less applicable to such a person? That it
offends proportionality theory to punish a mentally disabled person as
severely as a nonmentally disabled person? That a more severe punishment
might be counterproductive in the case of a mentally disabled criminal
defendant?
Congress's failure to provide any coherent explanation or clarification
as to the relative weight that the Commission was to give to individual
offender characteristics, and its failure to prioritize the philosophical
purposes of sentencing, combined to provide the Commission with very
little structure in the creation of its policy statements. 5 ' The Commission
compounded this error by failing to include in its policy statements any
reference to empirical studies or evidence regarding the effect of mental
disability on sentencing patterns. We can tentatively conclude from
these failures that neither the Commission nor Congress was terribly
interested in therapeutic issues or in the therapeutic effect of sentences, a
disinterest certainly consistent with the Guidelines' focus on retribution as
the primary philosophical rationale of federal sentencing policies.''
We do know, however, the way in which mentally disabled prisoners
are treated.152 Mentally ill prisoners have always been relegated to low
status in prison settings;' they are often institutionalized in facilities
bereft of even minimal mental health services; and they are often treated
more harshly than other inmates." Any change in the law-be it
restrictions on the use of the insanity defense,' diminution of inquiries
into defendant's capacity to plead guilty or waive counsel, 5 6 or restrictive
interpretations of the Guidelines-that results in more mentally disabled
150. Stith & Koh, supra note 19, at 300.
151. Bomstein, supra note 40, at 142,
152. See generally Fred Cohen & Joel A. Dvoskin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Corrections: A Glimpse, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 777 (1993) (setting out a broad
understanding of therapeutic jurisprudence and describing the impact that some characteristics
of correctional policy have on therapeutic jurisprudence analysis); Fred Cohen & Joel A.
Dvoskin, Inmates with Mental Disorders: A Guide to Law and Practice, 16 MENT. & PaYs.
DIs. L. RPmr. 339 (1992) (discussing the right of inmates and detainees with mental disorders
to obtain treatment).
153. Seymour Halleck, The Criminal's Problem With Psychiatry, in READINGS IN LAW
AND PsYCHIATRY 51 (R. Allen et al. eds., 1975).
154. PERLIN, INSANrrY DEFENSE, supra note 10, at 428 n.55; see Deborah Baskin et al.,
Assessing the Impact of Psychiatric Impairment on Prison Violence, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. 271,
272 (1991) (noting the mentally ill have a higher rate of disciplinary infractions than other
inmates).
155. PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 10, at 427-29.
156. Michael L. Perlin, A Major Step Backward: Deciphering Godinez v. Moran, 2
CRIM. PRAC. L. REP. 89 (1994); PERLIN, supra note 124, § 4.13.
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people being incarcerated in prisons or in longer prison sentences for the
mentally disabled will be antitherapeutic.'
57
What impact will this subordination of mental disability as a reductive
factor have on the lives of mentally disabled criminal offenders (and on
their keepers and their cellmates)? It is likely that only the most disabled-
perhaps the group least likely to show substantial improvement in a penal
setting-will qualify for downward departures. Many seriously disabled
defendants will be subject to lengthy terms of imprisonment. These terms
will likely often have detrimental effects: Symptomatology will be
exacerbated and prison facilities will become even more dangerous. Also,
it is likely that some defense counsel will discourage clients from making
showings of mental disability for fear of upward departures, thus diminish-
ing the likelihood that such a defendant will receive any meaningful
treatment once incarcerated. When such untreated inmates are eventually
released into community settings, we can expect that recidivism rates will
increase, having the effect of restarting this vicious cycle. Again, these
impacts are profoundly antitherapeutic.
VIII. Conclusion
In a recent article, Dr. Robert Weinstock and his colleagues argue that
psychiatric evidence should be more extensively and creatively developed
in federal sentencing cases so as to "temper judicial rigidity" under the
Guidelines.15 To the best of our knowledge, this is the only example in
the legal or behavioral literature calling for such expanded use of mental
disability evidence at the sentencing stage in Guidelines cases. Given this
level of academic apathy, it should not be a surprise that the relevant cases
sadly and predictably track the sanist and pretextual ways that factfinders
generally "process" mental disability evidence in the criminal trial process,
leading to the now familiar "doctrinal abyss." '159 Judges continue to
narrowly construe such evidence, to attribute blame to mentally disabled
offenders, to demand near total incapacitation prior to invocation of the
downward departure policy, and to misunderstand the relationship between
mental disability and criminal behavior.
We chose to title this Article Rashomon and the Criminal Law... to
157. PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENsE, supra note 10, at 428.
158. Weinstock et al., supra note 20, at 72.
159. See PERLIN, INsANrrY DEFENSE, supra note 10, at 406-15 (discussing how sanism
and pretextuality on the part of judges and lawyers have created an incoherent jurisprudence);
Perlin, supra note 9, at 4 (discussing lack of doctrinal cohesiveness in the jurisprudence
regarding mental illness).
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stress the importance of perspective. The Guidelines appear to countenance
downward departures in cases of mentally disabled offenders. Indeed, from
Congress's vantage point that is exactly what the Guidelines say. Perspec-
tives of judges, lawyers, and mental disability professionals, not to mention
the defendants themselves, suggest very different approaches.
The Guidelines have come under significant criticism in recent years,
mostly on the part of federal judges protesting the Guidelines' Draconian
effect on low-level drug offenders. In April 1993, Judge Jack Weinstein of
the Eastern District of New York announced that he was taking his "name
out of the wheel for drug cases" because "[he] can simply not sentence
another impoverished person whose destruction has no discernable effect on
the drug trade."1'6 Disproportionately severe sentences for low-level drug
offenders continue to sustain widespread judicial criticism.161 More
recently, federal judge John S. Martin stated, "Sending street level dealers
... to jail for ten years will have no impact on the drug problem in this
country. It does, however, reflect poorly on our system of justice."'
62
State court judges have also joined in voicing dissatisfaction with
excessive drug sentences, which disproportionately affect low-level drug
users. In People v. Perez,'63 Justice Caro declared:
In considering this sentencing issue I cannot help but question
whether the hemorrhage of taxpayer funds used to warehouse thousands
of low-level drug users and sellers for long periods of time in our
dangerously overcrowded prisons, at a cost of $35,000 per year per
inmate in addition to the capital expenditure of $180,000 per prison cell,
could not be more productively and humanely directed toward preven-
tion, through education, and treatment of drug addiction. The increas-
ingly unavoidable conclusion that with the passage of time is becoming
more widely recognized and articulated by respected representatives of
our criminal justice system, is that the primary method currently utilized
to deal with the drug epidemic, essentially an effort to eliminate the
availability of drugs on our streets, while increasing inordinately the
length of prison terms for low-level drug offenders, has failed.
64
Yet, with the exception of a couple student notes mentioning in
passing some of the cases discussed here, t16 there has not been a word in
160. Henry J. Reske, Senior Judge Declines Drug Cases; Says He Has Been A Party To
Cruelty By Imposing Required, Harsh Sentences, 79 A.B.A. J. 22, 22 (July 1993).
161. Deborah Young, Rethinking the Commission's Drug Guidelines: Courier Cases
Where Quantity Overstates Culpability, 3 FED. SENT. R. 63, 63 (Sept.-Oct. 1990).
162. United States v. Genao, 831 F. Supp. 246, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
163. 599 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (Caro, J., concurring) (footnotes
omitted).
164. Id. at 270-71 (citations omitted).
165. Montgomery, supra note 29; Shuttleworth, supra note 51.
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a legal journal criticizing the pattern of mental disability case decision-
making. On one hand, this is not surprising. Mental disability issues are
trivialized, misunderstood, and distorted at all levels of the trial system.
The current political climate is one in which any potentially mitigating
circumstance will be viewed suspiciously, especially one as "loaded" as
mental disability.
On the other hand, however, the issue is an important one that
demands further reflective consideration by scholars, judges, prosecutors,
social theorists, and legislators. If this Article helps illuminate the ways
that sanism and pretextuality have infected the federal sentencing process,
then we hope that such consideration will be forthcoming.

